Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on
relations between the United States and Japan
and between the European Community and Japan by Romoli, Mr.




the United States and Japan 
and between 
fi7ZJo 
the European Community and Japan 
OPINION 
I ~ I EUROPEAN M COMMUNITIES 




ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
*-CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY 
'JieJations between the Ullited States and Japii/J 










This publication is available in the following languages: 
German, English, and French. 
The text of this publication may be reproduced freely in whole or in part, provided 
the source is acknowledged. 
Catalogue No.: ESC-91-012-EN 
EXT/79 
EC-US-JAPAN 
Brussels, 25 April1991 
OPINION 
of the Economic and Social Committee 
on 
Relations between the United States and Japan 
and between the European Community and Japan 

On 27 March 1990 the Economic and Social Committee, acting under the fourth para-
graph of Article 20 of its Rules of Procedure, decided to draw up an Own-initiative 
Opinion on: 
Relations between the United States and Japan and between the European Commu-
nity and Japan. 
The Section for External Relations, which was responsible for preparing the Commit-
tee's work on the subject, adopted its Opinion on 9 April1991. The Rapporteur was 
Mr ROMOLI. 
At its 286th Plenary Session (meeting of25 April1991), the Economic and Social Com-
mittee unanimously adopted the following Opinion: 
In this Opinion the Economic and Social Committee considers the development of eco-
nomic relations between the United States and Japan and between the European Com-
munity and Japan. 
The Opinion begins by recalling that recently feelings of distrust, frustration and hostil-
ity towards Japan have developed in the United States, in tandem with the increase 
in the US trade deficit, the penetration of Japanese products and the acquisition by 
Japanese firms of US industry and real estate (see point 1.1.). 
Japan has reacted with equal bitterness, pointing out (point 1.2.) that the deteriora-
tion in the United States' economic situation was essentially due to the lack of com-
petitiveness of US exports, an apparently dwindling entrepreneurial spirit and 
inadequate domestic savings, aggravated by the impact of deficits in the US balance 
of payments and federal budget and long periods during which the dollar was over-
valued. 
In 1990, with the aim of removing the main causes of the economic friction which had 
developed, the US and Japanese Governments concluded an agreement entitled the 
"Structural Impediments Initiative" (SII) which constitutes an unprecedented experi-
ment in bilateral relations (point 1.3.). 
Under the SII, each partner undertakes to take economic and social measures designed 
to improve the climate and conditions governing relations between the two countries. 
If successful, the SII may also improve relations with third countries. 
On EC-Japan relations, the Opinion examines the situation of imbalance which de-
veloped in the '70s and '80s as a result of the sharp growth in Japanese exports and 
the closed Japanese market combined with the lack of interest shown by EC firms in 
exporting to Japan (point 2.1.). 
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The Community's trade policy vis-a-vis Japan developed mainly through the appli-
cation of the anti-dumping rules drawn up by the GATT (point 2.2.). 
For Japanese firms, the arrival of the Community-wide single market by the end of 
1992 continues to awaken fears that they will be hit by discriminatory protectionist 
measures (point 2.3.). 
On the other hand, they are aware of the attractions of a large homogenous market 
(320 million people) open to cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. 
The increase in direct investments by Japanese firms in productive plant in Europe 
is a response to these new prospects (point 2.4.) and gives some indication of their desire 
to play an active part in the development of the European economy. 
Special problems have arisen in the motor vehicle and other sensitive industries con-
cerning the proportion of components and parts supplied by EC firms contained in 
the final products (point 2.5.). 
In January 1990 meetings were held between the Japanese Prime Minister and represen-
tatives of the EC Commission, followed by meetings at technical level. The two sides 
declared their wish to strengthen mutual cooperation and establish close relations on 
a permanent basis (point 2.5.). 
The final part of the Opinion sets out conclusions and puts forward recommendations 
for the improvement of EC-Japan relations. 
The need to deepen understanding of each other's cultural and social aspects is stressed 
(point 3.4.). 
Japan's socio-economic structures are changing: the efforts of the Japanese authori-
ties to open up the internal market, boost domestic demand and public investment and 
improve its population's quality of life must be followed with interest (points 2.2.5., 
3.2., and 3.10.). 
EC entrepreneurs should step up their own efforts to establish themselves permanently 
on the Japanese market (points 3.5. and 3.6.). The rise in direct Japanese investment 
in Europe should be welcomed, since it involves transfers of technological know-how 
and organizational methods, and a growth in new jobs (point 3.8.). 
Finally, the Opinion points out that the world's three main centres of political and eco-
nomic power- the United States, the European Community and Japan- should cooper-
ate more closely in order to solve the problems of the international economy 
(point 3.11.). 
The world scene against which this Opinion is set 
From the end of the Second World War up to the mid-1980s the world stage was domi-
nated by two countries exercising virtually absolute power: the United States and the 
Soviet Union. 
The United States enjoyed clear superiority in the political, military, industrial, financial 
and scientific spheres. In contrast, the Soviet Union's ideological, military and eco-
nomic leadership prevailed in extensive areas of the less developed world. 
In the space of five years, between 1985 and 1990, this situation radically changed. 
The Soviet Union saw a rapid decline in its political power on the world stage and is 
currently torn by dramatic economic and structural upheavals. Nonetheless, its mas-
sive military force is still a factor to be reckoned with. 
Today the international scene is dominated by three centres of power, each with its 
broad area of influence: The United States, Japan and the European Community. 
The United States is now the only superpower to exercise international military, po-
litical and economic influence. However, its leadership is constrained by domestic eco-
nomic and financial problems and the need to coordinate any international political 
action with its allies, within the responsible political institutions (United Nations). 
Community Europe, reinvigorated by the pending Single Market and reinforced by 
the reunification of Germany, faces an exciting future with the opening up of Eastern 
Europe and possibly the Soviet Union too. However, it still lacks political clout. 
Japan, which has become a world economic and financial power, is in a similar situa-
tion to the EC. 
All three centres of economic power, the United States, Japan and Europe, have market 
economies and already bound by very close ties: 60"7o of international trade, 90"7o of 
world investment, an overwhelming share of world R&D capacity, a virtually exclu-
sive monopoly over new technology and lastly, absolute pre-eminence in the finan-
cial and monetary sectors. 
Nonetheless, in terms of their economic and social structures and cultural origins these 
three powers differ substantially from each other. In the economic sector, however, 
all three adhere to the principles of the free market economy. 
Relations between the three powers have had their ups and downs, with phases of 
productive cooperation and common objectives alternating with periods of friction 
and sharp clashes of interests. 
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Nonetheless the partners are united by their increasing interdependence and clear duty 
to draw up plans, within the framework of the United Nations, for an international 
order counteracting international instability and tensions and to frame new arrange-
ments for cooperation between the industrialized countries and the LDCs. 
The purpose of this Own-initiative Opinion is to shed light on the state of US-Japan 
and EC-J apan economic relations and to chart the way ahead for more effective cooper-
ation in future on a number of fronts. 
1. Relations between the United States and Japan: frictions between partners 
1 .1 . US anxieties 
1.1.1. In recent years a highly disquieting wave of frustration, distrust and mutual 
hostility has emerged in the two friendly partners. 
In a recent US opinion survey, 680Jo of the respondents mentioned Japan as an even 
greater threat to the United States than the Soviet Union had been in the past. 
Assailed by criticism and accusations, Japanese public opinion reacted with resent-
ment and intolerance reflected in a surge of nationalism. 
1.1.2. The cause of the current unease in the United States lies in the general public's 
frustration and anxiety fuelled by the incomplete information provided by the press 
and declarations by certain politicians who find it easy to blame Japan for being the 
main cause of the woes of the US economy, the persistent trade deficit1 and the 
difficulties faced by US exports. 
The US mass media also tend to highlight the acquisition by the Japanese investors 
of major sectors of US industry and the property market. 
In addition, the Japanese economy is spared the burden of heavy military expen-
diture.2. 
1.1.3. In addition, US economic experts and politicians find the Treasury's increas-
ing dependence on financing from Tokyo (which is now vital to cover the federal budget 
deficit) particularly disquieting. 
1 In 1987 the US ran a US$ 52,000 million trade deficit with Japan; this dropped to US$ 45,000 million in 
1989 and US$ 38,000 million in 1990. 
2 Japan points out that it has stepped up its aid to the LDCs and now heads the list of donor countries (at 
over US$ 10,000 million per annum). In addition, Japan provides substantial aid to Eastern Europe. 
Within a short space, as a result of the cumulative effect of these financial movements, 
the United States has slid into a state of heavy debt to international financial sources, 
particularly Japan. 
Underlying the above developments is the vague fear current among public opinion, 
politicians and economists that the United States is gradually losing its traditional tech-
nologicalleadership and hence its "status" as a world economic superpower. 
1.1.4. Prompted by these anxieties, US moves have been in progress for some time 
to tackle the problem of economic relations with Japan by resorting to all manner of 
bilateral trade instruments and ''managed trade'' arrangements, even if these breach 
commitments under GATT multilateral agreements. 
Consequently, during the '70s and '80s a large number of general and specific agree-
ments were framed which contained increasingly precise demands by the United States 
for Japan to liberalize certain categories of products or types of operations in order 
to give US exports preferential access to the Japanese market. Again and again the 
Tokyo Government was asked to give voluntary restraint undertakings as regards the 
export of particular products (cars, steel, semi-conductors, etc.). 
The tangible results of these operations proved disappointing and fuelled further mutual 
recrimination and heated disputes. 
1.1. 5. Some groups within Congress and Washington intellectual circles have become 
increasingly convinced that it is wrong to harbour any illusions: the Japanese would 
never change their attitudes, their industrial policies or their desire to conquer world 
markets. The only way to fight back and curb such expansionist tendencies is direct, 
unilateral retaliation in the shape of appropriate legislation. 
This line of argument led the US Congress to draft and approve the protectionist Trade 
Act of 1979, reinforced 10 years later by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 
of 1988, which President REAGAN signed in July that year. 
The ESC has had occasion to express its views on these laws, which are inconsistent 
with the multilateral undertakings given by the United States in international forums 
and in particular undermined the Uruguay Round of Gatt negotiations. 3. 
In July 1989 the BUSH Administration took the initiative of proposing to the new 
Japanese Government headed by Prime Minister TOSHIKI KAIFU that it made a fresh 
effort on the bilateral front to get trade relations between the two countries off to a 
new start and improve the climate of mutual relations. This proposal, known as the 
"Structural Impediments Initiative -SII'' will be discussed below (point 1.3.). 
3 See ESC Opinion of 20 September 1990 (CES 1062/90) on the final stage of the GATT /Uruguay Round 
Negotiations. 
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1.2. Japanese response 
1.2.1. The wave of criticism and recrimination in the United States, which does not 
seem to have abated now that the Gulf War has ended, has directly affected Japanese 
political and economic circles, which remain highly sensitive to US arguments, and 
triggered heated and conflicting reactions. 
Japanese public opinion is still largely favourable to the United States. The assistance 
provided during the difficult years of post-war occupation and the aid received dur-
ing the period of reconstruction have not been forgotten. 
However, such feelings have recently been marred by bitterness, disillusionment, pes-
simism for the future and certain symptoms of growing nationalism. 
1.2.2. In the first place Japan refuses to accept the argument that it is mainly to blame 
for US economic difficulties. 
Japan explicitly urges the United States to acknowledge that the root cause for its eco-
nomic problems is the misguided economic policy pursued in the '80s. This period was 
not only one of proud expansion (as the official propaganda of the REAGAN era has 
so often repeated) but also one which laid the foundations for the structural imbalances 
now becoming visible, which indicate that the country has been living far too long be-
yond its productive means. 
The most obvious sign of this plight is the dwindling competitiveness of US exports 
on international markets, which in the past were further undermined by the policy of 
an overvalued dollar. 
1.2.3. Japanese observers hold that one of the key reasons for this phenomenon is 
the psychological change that has recently taken place in US businesses, which seem 
to have lost their traditional creative drive and now focus solely on the mirage of short-
term financial benefits and quick profit.4 This approach is argued to have generated 
excessive faith in the idea of a' 'post-industrial society'' based virtually entirely on serv-
ices, at the expense of manufacturing industry and production of consumer goods, 
which today the United States has to import on a large scale. 
Japanese critics also claim that Japan cannot be blamed if the United States has in the 
past invested far less in plant and research than Japan and even Europe. 
4 The President of SONY, Mr Akio MORITA, in his much-discussed book "The Japan that can say NO", 
coN authored with the politician Mr Shintaro ISHIHARA, claims that something has gone wrong with US 
business. Its only concern is four-monthly balance sheets and share ratings rather than long-term invest-
ment. Apparently it has forgotten that the creation of real wealth presupposes the creation of new value-
added, especially in manufacturing industries able to compete on the international market. 
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1.2.4. Further, the United States has had to fund its own needs from borrowed capi-
tal (a substantial part of which comes from Japan) since its own level of domestic sav-
ings was inadequate. It has therefore had to maintain high interest rates. This has 
sometimes led to an overvalued dollar fluctuating sharply against other currencies. 
This situation persists. 
According to some Japanese (and even US) observers, the declining standards of the 
US educational system (especially at primary and secondary school level) may also have 
contributed to the difficulties besetting the country's economy. 
1.2.5. However, the theories advanced by Japan were not confined to a defence 
against US accusations but included an analysis of the internal aspects of Japanese 
economic policy. This new development is of some importance. 
Japan recognized, for instance, that its internal market had effectively remained iso-
lated and sealed off for far too long and that the complaints of other countries are 
at least partially justified. Japan could not have continued to conduct a trade policy 
designed solely to boost exports without making space for goods and services import-
ed from third countries. 
Consequently urgent action was needed and the Uruguay Round of GATT negations 
are seen by Japanese political protagonists as an opportunity for a general reduction 
of non-tariff barriers by all contracting parties. 
1.2.6. A number of more recent Japanese studies indicate that the time has come to 
move to a new phase and away from a trade policy where national export priorities 
were established and efficient plans as to how targets were to be attained were drawn 
up by Japan's Ministry for International Trade and Industry- MITI. 
It is claimed that the MITI's activities in recent years have been confined to identify-
ing the long-term strategic objectives to be pursued by Japan. 
Such claims are viewed with considerable caution in the United States and EC. 
Though the MITI has apparently scaled down its direct efforts to guide and influence 
the various sectors of the economy, close-knit cohesion continues to prevail in Japan's 
systematic, consistent pursuit of long-term goals, which are invariably attained. 
In practice the "Japan Inc." concept does not yet seem to have been superseded. 
Japanese firms are able, now as in the past, to make substantial profits on the domes-
tic market, which is well-protected and allows the maintenance of high prices. In this 
way they can "subsidize" their exports and frame long-term expansion programmes, 
which even allow for sustained losses over a lengthy period, for the ultimate aim of 
penetrating specific markets (including both the industrialized countries and LDCs) 
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and establishing bridgeheads in pre-targeted sectors. In this connection, firms can rely 
on the direct support of government agencies and the cooperation of a powerful finan-
cial system which provides them with long-term funding at interest rates well below 
the rates prevailing on US and EC markets. 
However, the Japanese economy seems to be undergoing major structural changes. 
One important typical change is the climate of cut-throat competition between Japanese 
firms within one and the same industrial sector. This very specific form of competi-
tion is exclusively based on quality and innovation as opposed to prices (which remain 
very high on the domestic market). 
Such competition extends beyond national frontiers to the markets of South East Asia, 
North America and Europe. 
The large Japanese industrial conglomerates, on account of their size, financial au-
tonomy and ''global'' approach to the world market, are now de facto ''multination-
al" and no longer heavily dependent on Japanese economic policy. 
1.2. 7. Other observers and experts have also focused attention on the far-reaching 
upheavals currently under way in the very structures of Japanese society.5 
They have pointed out, for instance, that demographic indicators augur a significant 
ageing of the population, together with behavioral changes whereby individuals and 
families will gradually turn away from the values of sobriety, frugality and acceptance 
of spartan living conditions towards a higher standard of living. 
The rejection of traditional values is particularly marked in the younger generation. 
It is even claimed that changes are discernible as regards total dedication to work, loyalty 
to the group and the company and the relinquishing of individuality, all of which dis-
tinguished the Japanese worker in the decades from the end of the war to the present 
day.6 
These trends will obviously move very slowly. But, should they become established, 
could alleviate concern over the continued, unstoppable growth of Japanese economic 
power, entailing deficits and tensions with both the United States and the rest of the 
world. 
5 See "The Sun also sets- the limits to Japan's economic power" by Bill EMMOTT, The Economist, Lon-
don, which received widespread circulation in Japan. 
6 Western observers, however, point out that the Japanese industrial workforce still work a far longer 
week/year than its EC or US counterparts. In some instances, working hours have actually increased if 
overtime is taken into account. 
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We should therefore ask ourselves about the future of Japan as a country whose popu-
lation wishes to model itself more on the behaviour of the affluent societies of the 
Western world and to derive more direct economic and social advantages from Japan's 
extraordinary economic success. There is greater willingness to participate and con-
tribute to the world political and economic order while still retaining distinctive Japanese 
cultural characteristics. 
With this in mind, even the large Japanese trade surplus 7 could ultimately be spon-
taneously reabsorbed as a result of the above phenomena of an ageing population, 
increased quality of life and domestic consumption and the sharp rise in social wel-
fare costs. 
As already mentioned, this will be a slow process and encounter much resistance but 
it seems reasonable to hope that the western countries (first and foremost the United 
States and the EC) with which Japan has substantial political, economic and cultural 
relations will do everything possible to facilitate and encourage the trend in Japanese 
society that currently seems discernible. 
1.3. The "Structural Impediments Initiative": An agreement "sui generis" 
between the United States and Japan 
1.3.1. The SII talks, launched in July 1989 by President BUSH, are unique. Though 
their stated aim is to remedy imbalances in trade between the United States and Japan, 
they focus on the root causes of the two countries' economic and social policies and 
take a new approach to matters previously considered to be the exclusive preserve of 
the individual governments. 
The SII is less a traditional trade agreement than a reciprocal commitment autono-
mously given by each party on points suggested by the other. 
This "sui generis" agreement is therefore an attempt which, if successful, could in-
fluence relations between Japan and the entire community of Western countries. As 
devised, it is an innovatory model which the United States could also propose (or im-
pose) in respect of other countries. 
1.3.2. In April 1990 two "ad interim" reports were signed in Washington which 
separately list the measures that the Japanese and US governments agree to take at 
the request of the other party. The following June the two provisional reports were 
consolidated in a single final document setting out in detail the aims which the two 
parties undertook to pursue. 
7 The appended Table 1 sets out statistics on Japan's overall trade surplus, which was as high as US$ 82,700 
million in 1986 (of which US$ 51,400million vis-a-vis the United States). Other statistics indicate that the 
US ran a US$ 52,000 million trade deficit with Japan in 1987; dropping to US$ 38,000 million in 1990. 
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During the talks, the United States presented an extensive set of proposals and sug-
gestions, which were largely accepted by Japan. 
The Japanese Government's undertakings can be summed up as follows: 
acknowledgement of the need to reduce Japan's current trade surplus by adopt-
ing economic policies aimed at stimulating non-inflationist growth generated by 
domestic demand; 
substantial increase in public investment (increase of YEN 430 trillion over ten years 
- approx. 1 OOJ'o of GDP) with priority emphasis on urban infrastructure, housing, 
construction, airports and ports, environmental protection and conservation of 
the natural heritage. The stated aim is enhancement of the population's quality 
of life and the absorption of a substantial part of the capital constituted in Japan, 
thereby giving a sharp boost to domestic demand and imports and benefiting the 
national economy as a whole; 
alleviation of urban land cost discrepancies which are a major obstacle to the sit-
ing of foreign firms' offices and production units, by making more publicly-owned 
land available for building purposes; 
liberalization of the distribution sector which is now a de facto obstacle to other 
countries' exports reaching the end consumer in Japan; 
streamlining of import procedures; 
more stringent application of Japanese legislation protecting market competition 
from illegal inter-company deals, restrictive practices, cartels, monopolies, bar-
riers to market access and providing for measures to check preferential agreements 
between large concerns designed to keep out foreign entrepreneurs (Keiretsu rela-
tionships); · 
gradual alignment of the Japanese working week with practices in Western 
countries; 
more active and systematic curbs on price differentials between Japanese goods 
sold on the domestic market and the very low prices at which the same products 
are sold on external markets. 
Lastly, the US negotiators explicitly requested preferential access for specific US in-
dustrial and agricultural exports and services (forestry products, satellites, aircraft, 
supercomputers). 
1.3.3. Here it is clear that traditional trade clauses go hand in hand with measures 
relating to national economic and social policy which are unprecedented in the histo-
ry of bilateral economic agreements. Some Japanese circles have condemned them as 
intolerable interference, infringing Japans's sovereignty. 
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Interestingly, however, many of the US demands are based on proposals which had 
already been tabled and discussed by Japanese politicians and economists in favour 
of opening up the country to the outside world (cf. the 1986 Mekawa report). This partly 
explains the favourable reaction of Japanese public opinion to this initiative. 
1.3.4. The proposals addressed by Japan to the US Administration and accepted by 
the latter, also contain a number of new and somewhat surprising features. 
Washington is asked to take decisive action to remedy the structural problems inher-
ent in the federal budget deficit, the low US family savings ratio, the failure of US 
products to compete successfully on the international market, the emphasis placed by 
US firms on short-term management, the low commitment to R&D and, lastly, the 
poor standard of schooling and vocational training. 
Nor are the unduly tough discretionary regulations impeding Japanese imports into 
the United States overlooked. 
These requests largely relate to US domestic policy and have already been identified 
by the BUSH Administration as priority aims for the near future. However, they have 
been adopted as bilateral commitments vis-a-vis Japan, almost as if they exclusively 
concerned the two partners as opposed to exercising an undoubted influence on the 
balance of relations between the world's largest economic power and the rest of the 
world. From this angle, the SII agreement has been criticized by Community observers. 
1.3.5. Cooperation within the SII framework has only recently got under way and 
a number of difficulties and delays are already on the horizon. 
Regardless of this undertaking, US-Japan relations are bound to become increasing-
ly close in the near future, especially if the predicted expansion of the ''Pacific Area'' 
(which is far more dynamic than the North Atlantic area) becomes a reality. 
2. EC-Japan relations 
2.1. From initial indifference to the flood of Japanese exports in the '70s and '80s 
2.1.1. Immediately after the war, up to the late '60s, relations between Japan and 
the individual European countries (grouped within the European Communities since 
1959) were far from close. 
Community businessmen saw no particular reason to take an interest in Japan, which 
they regarded as a remote, unfamiliar country, grappling with serious economic 
difficulties. 
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On the Japanese side, Europe was seen as a region with great cultural traditions, capable 
of substantial economic growth but of no immediate interest. Attention was focused 
primarily on South East Asia and on bilateral relations with the United States, which 
became very close after 1950, as a result of the Korean War. 
2.1.2. It was not until1970that trade relations between the two areas rapidly gathered 
momentum, triggered by Japan's impressive industrial and trade potential. 
During the decade 1970 to 1980 trade between the partners shot up from US$ 30,000 
million to US$ 250,000. However, the balance was heavily in favour of Japan, which 
quickly accumulated a large export surplus. European exports offset only 340Jo of im-
ports from Japan and found it difficult to penetrate the Japanese market. 
The Japanese "economic miracle" therefore became a reality for Europeans as well 
as the United States. 
2.1.3. European concern was soon translated into pressures for the adoption of 
protectionist -type measures to curb the flood of Japanese products. Several of the Mem-
ber States' governments took the step of reactivating the large number of quota res-
trictions left over from the immediate post-war period. Others adopted new ones. 
Such action was demanded by industry and the trade unions, enraged at aggressive 
Japanese export tactics. Such exports were sold at rock bottom prices Gustified only 
partly by low labour costs) and targeted dangerously on specific sectors and segments 
of the market, jeopardizing national industrial firms and even forcing their closure. 
The EC Commission - which only received full powers to conduct a common trade 
policy in 1970 - initially stood by passively while the Member States tried to defend 
themselves in a period of serious economic crisis, inflation and growing unemploy-
ment, generated by the 1973 and 1979 oil shocks. 
On its side, Japan seemed unperturbed by the absence of a uniform Community-wide 
trade policy and continued to step up contacts and talks with the governments of the 
individual Member States, offering pragmatic solutions in the shape of partial volun-
tary export restraint agreements. For a long time little notice was taken of the EC 
authorities in Brussels, despite the latter's right to discuss relations affecting the EC 
in its entirety on a global basis. 
2.1.4. This disjointed state of affairs hindered EC trade relations with Japan from 
taking coherent shape so that for a long time they continued to be fragmented, with ' 
reactions varying from country to country. Hardly surprising in the circumstances that 
frictions and trade disputes proliferated. 
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The sectors worst hit by the first wave of Japanese exports were shipbuilding, elec-
tronic goods, audiovisual and photographic equipment, cars and motorcycles. In some 
sectors, the very survival of EC firms was threatened. 
2.2. Dynamic phase of EC trade policy 
2.2.1. In the '80s the EC Commission started to frame its own trade policy vis-a-vis 
third countries. 
The starting point was effective application of the GATT multilateral anti-dumping 
agreements. With increasing frequency, procedures were instigated to stop third coun-
tries exporting goods at prices below those obtaining on their home markets. While 
this policy is not specifically directed against Japanese exports, the fact remains that 
Japanese products are frequently affected. 
2.2.2. In 1982 the French Government took the controversial step of concentrating 
customs clearance operations for Japanese video recorders in a single regional cus-
toms office, at Poi tiers, (a decision which was subsequently revised following EC in-
tervention). 8 
In 1984 the EC instigated an anti-dumping procedure in respect of imports of elec-
tronic typewriters. In 1985 it was the turn of photocopiers and, in 1986 microwave 
ovens, printers and microconductors. 
2.2.3. The purpose of these much publicized initiatives was primarily to impress on 
Japan that the EC would not stand by idly while its traditional or new technology in-
dustries were destroyed as a result of trade practices deemed to be unfair. Concurrently, 
Brussels explored the feasibility of adopting, within the framework of GATT, safeguard 
measures selectively targeted on specific countries. 
The EC Commission has also focused attention on the expediency of supporting the 
US attempt to give legal substance to the idea that advantages must be equitably 
balanced in relations between the GATT contracting parties. Legal action and safeguard 
measures would then have been justified in the event of persistent Japanese structural 
trade surpluses. (This attempt as we know, was unsuccessful). 
With a view to improving its relations with Japan, the EC launched a number of posi-
tive measures, including training schemes enabling young business executives from the 
Twelve to spend extended periods in Japan for the purpose of studying, working and 
learning Japanese.9 
8 In Japan the Poitiers episode triggered fierce indignation and for a long time was seen as symbolizing the 
EC countries' protectionist attitude. 
9 See European Community Export Programme "EXPROM" and, in particular, one of its key elements: 
the Executive Training Programme. 
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The Commission also made approaches to the Japanese authorities in an attempt to 
improve market access for EC goods and services. 
2.2.4. In 1984, after lengthy debate, the EC approved a regulation (commonly known 
as the "New Instrument") designed to strengthen EC trade policy to curb illegal trade 
practices by third parties that were not covered by anti-dumping legislation (Regula-
tion 2641/84). These provisions came as a response to the US Congress measures rein-
forcing US unilateral trade safeguard powers (Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1979). 
The "New Instrument", however, was of limited scope and was never applied vis-a-
vis Japan. 10 
Lastly, in 1987 the EC instigated a procedure (subsequently upheld) under GATT 
against discrimination in the Japanese system of levying duties on imported wines and 
alcoholic beverages. Here the EC started to turn its attention to the opening-up of 
Japan's internal market, a matter in which the United States alone had previously been 
interested. 
2.2.5. The Japanese authorities reacted strongly, accusing the EC Commission of 
interpreting the GATT anti-dumping rules in an arbitrary manner applying devious 
and discriminatory procedures and introducing new protectionist instruments into its 
trade legislation. 
In addition, the Tokyo Government drew the attention of the Community and the 
governments of the individual EC Member States to the changes effected in the mid-'80s 
in Japanese trade policy, reflected in substantial cuts in, and even abolition of, many 
customs duties, the scrapping of many import quotas and the improvement and stream-
lining of certification systems and import procedures. 
Japan seems seriously committed to assuming a new profile, no longer anxious to push 
its own exports at all costs but ready to meet US and EC demands for easier access 
to its internal market. At the same time however, the Tokyo authorities insist that low 
EC exports to Japan are not due solely to market access difficulties but first and fore-
most to the indifference and disinterest of Community businessmen, who fail to make 
the requisite effort. 
The EC partners are also asked to bear in mind that Japan's strategies are currently 
undergoing rapid changes so as to allow considerable scope for direct investment in 
new manufacturing plant, as is occurring in the United States. Japan wishes the EC 
to take account of this new desire for cooperation. 
I 0 The Commission is currently examining, in accordance with this Regulation, an official complaint sub-
mitted to it by the European Community Shipowners Association concerning the Japanese Harbour 
Management Fund. (The alleged illicit practices consist of contributions by the shipowners to a Harbour 
Fund on the basis of an agreement concluded under the threat of non-handling of containerships in Japanese 
ports if it was not signed). 
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2.3. Japan's position in the run-up to the Community-wide single market in 1992 
2.3.1. The Community's announcement, in June 1985, that it intended to achieve 
complete unification of the markets of the Twelve by 1992 spurred Japan to review 
its policies vis-a-vis the'' old continent'', which it had hitherto regarded as a conglomer-
ation of widely disparate national economies. 
Japan became keenly interested in the prospect of a large, economically and legally 
unified, market of 320 million consumers, once the last barriers to internal circula-
tion of goods and services came down. There was growing realization of the potential 
advantages of uniform EC rules for imports from non-EC countries, accompanied 
by the phased dismantling of quota restrictions which, in some Member States~ have 
restricted, and even totally blocked, some Japanese exports. 
However, in Japanese eyes, completion of the large Community-wide single market 
and gradual progress towards greater political union were of even greater importance 
because they laid the foundations for a pooling of resources that could trigger, through-
out the Community area, a surge of growth with huge potential. Commission reports 
on the general and sectoral impact of economic union are carefully scrutinized by the 
Japanese Government's economic departments and by the large Japanese multinational 
concerns, which now regard Europe as an integral part of their global strategies. 
2.3.2. Events in Europe since 1985 have increasingly assumed the proportions of a 
historic change. The EC is the focus of international interest, after a long and trou-
bled period, and is exerting a pull on many countries, both near and further away. Un-
doubtedly this process is influenced, among other things, by the current upheavals in 
Eastern Europe, and indeed in the Soviet Union. 
Since then, spurred by fears that any new protectionist trends ("Fortress Europe", 
to quote the expression used in certain US circles) could create further problems for 
Japanese exports, Japan has recognized the need for a more active presence including 
the siting of industrial plant in the Community. 11 
2.3.3. During this period, when the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations got un-
der way, the EC undertook to look harder at its own trade policy vis-a-vis non-EC 
countries. 
The official stance of the EC Council and Commission (enshrined in the December 
1988 Rhodes declaration) is firmly in favour of general multilateral free trade rules 
based on a substantial reinforcement of GATT. 
II A number of surveys carried out by Japanese government bodies and industrial associations highlight per-
sistent fears that the Community's 1992 target conceals future discrimination against Japanese exports. 
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On the 1992 single market, the Community authorities stated categorically that the 
benefits of Community liberalization could not be extended automatically to non-EC 
countries unless accompanied by negotiations on reciprocal concessions to give Com-
munity firms similar access to non-EC markets, preferably within the multilateral 
framework of GATT, which specifically provides for efforts to achieve mutually 
balanced advantages. 12 
2.3.4. The Community's position vis-a-vis Japan is set out in its Communication of 
15 March 1988,13 the Commission states its intention of constructing "a balanced 
relationship" safeguarding reciprocal interests as part of closer cooperation in the fields 
of trade, industry, services and science and technology. 
However, the Commission stressed the need for a "consistent and firm approach" 
to secure results from discussions with Japan, particularly to convince Japan to place 
less emphasis on exports and take serious steps to liberalize and reform its economic 
structures, while opening up its market to Community firms. 14 
2.4. Problems connected with direct investment by Japanese firms 
in the Community: the car industry 
2.4.1. The Commission's cautious and measured language regarding trade relations 
with Japan was prompted by the wide trade gap and differences of opinion between 
the two parties on the scope of GATT anti-dumping rules. 
The Commission was inclined to interpret these rules broadly and adopted appropri-
ate regulations to tackle a new aspect: the practices deployed by Japanese firms for 
the purpose of circumventing anti-dumping duties (parts and components are imported 
and then put together at assembly plants). 15 
The concept of a "minimum local content" entitling a product to be considered as 
being of Community origin (i.e. exempt from the quota restrictions still applied by 
some Member States to Japanese imports) sparked off an impassioned debate. 
However, standpoints differed significantly from one industrial sector to another. Some 
high technology sectors (e.g. the chemical industry) rejected even the principle of "local 
content", which was deemed incompatible with GATT rules. 
12 
"Europe 1992: Europe World Partner"- Commission information memorandum on statements made by 
Lord COCKFIELD and Mr DE CLERCK, Members of the Commission, at a debate on the external 
dimensions of the Single Market- 19 October 1988. 
13 "Relations between the Community and Japan"- Commission Communication- 15 March 1988. 
14 In this connection, Japan pointed out that its GDP growth had for several years been based on increased 
domestic demand and not on export trends. 
15 The parent regulation setting out EC policy on anti-dumping dates back to 1984 (Regulation No. 2176/84). 
These provisions were later supplemented by Regulation No. 1761187, which dealt with "screwdriver 
plants". In 1988 the Council adopted a consolidated anti-dumping regulation (Regulation No. 2423/88) 
incorporating the previous regulations. 
17 
The industrial sectors most directly affected by the all-out onslaught by Japanese firms 
to conquer market segments are at the opposite extreme. In the motor vehicle sector, 
in particular, there is much heated discussion about cars assembled at UK plants but 
which are in fact of Japanese origin and hence subject to quota restrictions limiting 
sale in some Member States. 
Attention gradually shifted to the percentage of EC-manufactured components and 
parts (60-800Jo) needed if such products were to qualify for Community origin. 
In addition, the Commission pointed with concern to a dangerous trend emerging in 
Member States, prompted by a wave of competition to attract Japanese investment 
in certain manufacturing sectors. 
2.4.2. Given the Community's hesitancy and internal dissension, Japan took action 
on two separate fronts. 
Firstly, the Tokyo Government formally invoked GATT to challenge the legality of 
Community regulations on the circumvention of anti-dumping duties via the device 
of "screwdriver" assembly plants. 
After an investigation lasting several months, an arbitration panel supported the 
Japanese complaint and declared the EC provisions incompatible with Articles III 
and XXX( d) of the General Agreement. The Commission appealed against the proce-
dure and validity of the panel's conclusions. The entire matter has now come within 
the scope of the Uruguay Round since the new anti-dumping code being framed should 
encompass the problem of circumvention of anti-dumping duties. 
Secondly, Japanese car producers in the Community are tackling the roots of the 
problem. In an effort to enhance their image, they accept the substance of the argu-
ments advanced by Community manufacturers and are losing no time in launching 
programmes for revamping their industrial plant sited in the Community in order to 
step up the proportion of EC-manufactured components and parts. 
These decisions show that Japanese firms are anxious to reappraise their role and be-
come "good corporate citizens of Europe". 
2.5. Top-level EC-Japan meetings in January 1990 herald the dawn 
of a new phase in cooperation 
2.5.1. In January 1990 a Japanese Government delegation, led by Prime Minister 
TOSHIKI KAIFU, held a meeting with the responsible Commission officials. 
The cordial and constructive atmosphere of these talks highlighted both parties' will-
ingness to achieve a quantum jump in their joint relationship, putting narrow clashes 
of short-term commercial interests behind them and espousing a broader, more far-
sighted approach. 
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Institutional cooperation between the Community and Japan entered a new phase. 
Official statements stressed the need to establish close relations on a permanent ba-
sis, on a par with longstanding Japan-US and Community-US relations. 
2.5.2. These talks were not confined to (often controversial) aspects of trade rela-
tions but embraced other broader issues such as the upheavals in Eastern Europe, EC 
economic and political union, North-South relations and relations with the US. 
On behalf of his Government Prime Minister TOSHIKI KAIFU whol~heartedly wel-
comed the completion of plans for EC economic and political union as conducive to 
the progress and development of trade relations and to international stability. 
Japan acknowledged the key role played by the Twelve within the "Group of 24", 
whose task is to provide practical aid and assistance to the fledgling democracies of 
Eastern Europe. Japan was already an active contributor to the group's programmes 
and stated its intention of coordinating its projects in Eastern Europe with Commu-
nity operations. 
Further, as regards relations with the developing countries (LDCs), the Community 
and Japan proposed to coordinate implementation of their development aid and tech-
nical assistance policies more closely. 16 
2.5.3. As to the future, the meeting in January culminated in the decision to place 
EC-Japan bilateral relations on a permanent footing operating at three levels: (a) meet-
ings, at a personal level, between the Commission President and the Japanese Prime 
Minister, (b) regular annual meetings at ministerial level and (c) at a technical level, 
closer liaison and consultations in the economic, science and technology, environment, 
cultural and social sectors. 
A ministerial-level meeting took place in Brussels in May 1990 and addressed key aspects 
of bilateral EC-Japan relations. A "standing working group on trade questions" was 
set up with the task of identifying impediments to satisfactory two-way trade and dis-
cussing possible action and solutions in the individual sectors concerned. 
The Japanese delegation confirmed that the measures envisaged in the US-Japanese 
"Structural Impediments Initiative" would not be exclusively bilateral but applied 
"erga omnes" so that they could also be extended to the EC. 
In response to Japanese anxieties the Commission representatives gave assurances that 
the future Community-wide Single Market would be open to non-EC partners (i.e. 
including Japan). 
16 Japan now tops the development aid league table to the LDCs ($ .... in .... ). 
19 
2.5.4. On removal of the remaining barriers to the Japanese market, the Commis-
sion announced a Community export drive to go hand in hand with a Japanese Govern-
ment programme to promote Community imports. 
Both delegations were particularly exercised by the matter of direct investment by Com-
munity firms in Japan, which is still very small. Proposals and suggestions for action 
will be framed in the near future. 
An agreement was signed on cooperation in the field of nuclear safety and protection. 
Other joint schemes are planned to step up future cooperation in the fields of science 
and technology, the environment, social affairs and cultural exchanges. 
2.5.5. The vexed issue of imports and Japanese investment in the car industry in the 
Community was not broached directly at the ministerial meeting in Brussels but dis-
cussed at separate talks both before and after the meeting. 
The discussions, which are still going on, focus on the following points: 
1) definition of a "transition period", running at least until1991, to enable the Com-
munity car industry to restructure and boost its competitiveness in preparation for 
an entirely open Community car market; 
2) during this period Japanese industry will restrict and monitor the number of vehi-
cles exported to the Community; cars manufactured within the EC will also be in-
cluded; 
3) the quota restrictions on Japanese cars in a number of Member States will be phased 
out. 
In a more general context, global trade reciprocity is another discussion topic. 
2.5.6. High-level meetings between the Community and Japan will continue in 1991. 
At the end of May, Commission President Jacques DELORS will pay an official visit 
to Tokyo. 
The Committee understands that the matter of a future joint declaration on EC-Japan 
relations is currently under discussion both in the Commission and in the Council. 
A further ministerial-level meeting between EC representatives and the Japanese 
Government is planned in the autumn for the purpose of re-examining matters that 
are still unresolved and stepping up economic and political cooperation. 
Additional bilateral contacts are scheduled in order to break the deadlock in the GATT 
Uruguay Round negotiations, which are of vital importance to both the EC and Japan. 
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3. ESC conclusions and recommendations on EC-J apan relations 
3.1. In the light of the Committee's studies and deliberations on EC-Japan rela-
tions over the past years, a number of conclusions can usefully be drawn, in the shape 
of recommendations addressed to the Community authorities with a view to bringing 
about a speedy and substantial qualitative improvement in this relationship and trans-
lating hopes for closer cooperation into reality. 
3 .2. First, implementation of the decisions already taken or announced by the 
Japanese Government for an overhaul of Japan's economic and trade policy and struc-
tures will clearly require much time and effort. 
However, it is encouraging to note that there have already been tangible signs of a 
change in direction. We will have to wait for these trends to be consolidated. 
Increased Japanese domestic demand, due to greater public investment and a rise in 
personal consumption has become the key factor in national economic growth and 
is pushing up imports generally, and manufactured imports in particular. 
For the first time for many years, the overall picture is one of Japanese imports rising 
faster than exports in terms of both value and volume, i.e. the overall Japanese trade 
surplus is contracting. 
This welcome trend is reflected in the reduction of Japan's trade surplus vis-a-vis the 
US and EC. Although it is difficult to compare EC and Japanese statistics, they would 
seem to bear out this downward curve. 17 
Japanese commentators take for granted that Japan's external trade patterns are be-
coming more mature (increased room for imports from the West of finished manufac-
tures and consumer goods and from South-East Asia of semi-finished products and 
components for use in Japanese industry, plus of course continuing imports of raw 
materials and energy). 18 
Trade relations between Japan and its Western partners could improve rapidly if, as 
is hoped, this trend is consolidated in the near future. The US, Japan and the EC could 
then focus their attention and efforts on a substantial expansion of cooperation in all 
areas. 
17 Official Japanese statistics indicate that Japan's trade surplus vis-a-vis the EC dropped to US$ 19,700 mil-
lion in 1989 compared with US$ 22,800 million in 1988. EUROSTAT figures show an EC deficit of 
21,200 million ECU for the first ten months of 1989, as against 24,500 million ECU in 1988. It is unfor-
tunate, however, that the two parties cannot agree on a uniform method for quantifying such important data. 
18 See "A l'Ecoute du Japon", 10 December 1990. 
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3.3. The Committee warmly welcomes the outcome of the latest meeting between 
Japanese Government and EC Commission representatives, which culminated in a joint 
decision to achieve a quantum jump in their joint relationship and espouse a broader, 
more far-sighted approach. 
The Committee would welcome the issuing of the mooted joint declaration on EC-
Japan relations, especially if it reinforces high level institutional contacts. 
This new phase will have to be underpinned by institutional cooperation at top level 
between the Japanese Government and the Commission, and at technical level. But 
there must also be regular liaison and consultation in the economic, scientific, cultur-
al and social sectors. 
The Committee fears that this second facet of cooperation may progress too slowly 
or that unexpected difficulties may arise when it comes to implementing the requisite 
projects, with the risk that official declarations will ultimately prove no more than emp-
ty words. That would be most unfortunate since the hoped-for improvement in EC-
Japan cooperation cannot conceivably be reduced to a formal list of dates. 
The Committee calls for immediate steps to establish the planned contacts at all levels 
and in particular stresses the importance of determining arrangements to bring the socio-
economic groups together in order to study their problems and compare notes. 
With this in mind, the Economic and Social Committee could play a key role and as-
sume significant responsibilities. 
3.4. Appraisal of Japan-EC relations highlighted several cases where mutual ig-
norance of the other's cultural and social values proved a serious obstacle. 
Europeans in particular are ignorant about Japanese society, which is rooted in spiritual 
and practical values that differ radically from European traditions. 
In Japan, a considerable effort has been made for many years to study and understand 
the European (and US) past and present, with particular reference to economic and 
cultural (and, perhaps, to a lesser extent, social and political) aspects. 19 
Europe therefore has to be better briefed about the distinctive characteristics of the 
Japanese population as a whole (including its culture, history and institutions), and 
the detailed workings of Japan's economic, manufacturing, financial and services 
sectors. 
I9 It has been pointed out that one reason for successful Japanese penetration of EC and US markets is the 
meticulous research carried out by Japanese entrepreneurs into Western consumers' requirements and prefer-
ences. EC firms by no means have a comparable insight into the Japanese consumer market. 
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The Committee hopes that immediate plans will be made for constructive schemes on 
all fronts, starting at school and university, with the emphasis on direct contacts be-
tween EC and Japanese businessmen and ordinary citizens and stressing the value of 
meetings, visits and seminars facilitating a wide-ranging interchange of experience at 
all levels. 
For instance, it would be useful to explore ways of exploiting fully the presence of thou-
sands of families of Japanese businessmen and officials working in EC Member States. 
Similarly, ways should be found of awakening the interest of the waves of Japanese 
tourists and encouraging them to play their part in promoting two-way information. 
3.5. EC-Japan economic and trade relations continue to be dominated by the need 
to boost the volume of EC exports to the Japanese domestic market. 
Here it must be remembered that Japanese rules and regulations are changing fast: 
many formal obstacles and constraints have already been scrapped while the most ob-
structive non-tariff barriers are slowly being relaxed. 
The Committee feels that the EC Commission must play a dynamic role in pinpoint-
ing the remaining direct or indirect obstacles and reach agreement with its Japanese 
counterpart on what action is required. 
That does not mean that the Japanese market will be easily accessible to EC industrial 
firms. On the contrary, in the immediate future it will become increasingly clear that 
the main hurdles stem from the highly competitive Japanese domestic market, cut-
throat competition both between local firms and against newcomers, strict rules and 
local practices and the psychological inhibitions of Japanese customers vis-a-vis for-
eign products. 
Following the example of those Community firms which have already gained a foothold 
in the Japanese market, all Community businessmen eager to succeed in Japan will 
have to make a special effort to tailor their products and sales tactics to the dictates 
of an economic and social climate that differs in many respects from the situation in 
the Member States. 
The EC Commission must give its backing and assistance to such drives which, over 
the next few years, will have to focus on improving the EC-Japan trade balance. 
3.6. The dearth ofEC manufacturing plants in Japan is clearly a source of concern. 
Past explanations for this state of affairs are now well-known. However, as already 
mentioned in the case of EC exports to Japan, the situation is rapidly improving, partly 
as a result of the steps being taken by the Japanese government to liberalize trade, both 
on its own initiative and in connection with the Structural Impediments Initiative. 
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The Committee urges the Commission to conclude with its Japanese counterpart a set 
of rules and specific incentives to encourage the establishment of EC firms in J apan20 
and to flesh out the concept of "reciprocity", which has so long been the subject of 
discussion. 
Concurrently, the Commission should endeavour to persuade Community business-
men to try harder to export to Japan's large and fast-expanding domestic market. 
3. 7. The Committee is concerned by the virtual absence of joint EC-J apanese bus-
iness ventures in third countries, particularly the LDCs, which cater for these coun-
tries' development needs. 
The increasing competitiveness of Japanese products on such markets, undermining 
long-established EC exports, highlights another weak link in the Member States' 
economies. 
The EC authorities should keep a keen eye on the question of industrial cooperation 
in third countries at future talks with their Japanese counterpart and press for studies, 
seminars and practical proposals. 
3.8. Particular attention should be focused on the problems associated with direct 
investment in Japanese manufacturing plant set up in the Community, partly because 
of the sharp increase in the number and size of such plants. 
In principle the Committee would stress that direct Japanese investment in the Com-
munity must be welcomed, especially when it means a boost in ''technological value-
added of Community origin"21 and the creation of new jobs. 
Similarly, cooperation agreements and joint EC-Japanese business ventures, which 
are frequently accompanied by technological innovation and modern business leader-
ship and m~magement practices, should be encouraged. 
Japanese manufacturing plant set up recently in the Community has frequently led 
to extensive transfers of know-how and organizational methods to the small and 
medium-sized EC sub-contractors who provide parts and components meeting the buy-
ers' strict quality control rules.22 
20 The Commission has already started to study the matter: see the recent publication - Guide to EC invest-
ment in Japan. 
21 "Technological value-added of Community origin" seems a more relevant criterion than "minimum lo-
cal content". 
22 The Japanese government agency JETRO's International Economic and Trade Information Center un-
dertakes periodical in-depth surveys of direct investment by Japanese manufacturing firms in the Com-
munity, the reasons prompting such investment and problems that have arisen. Its 6th Report "Current 
situation of business operations of Japanese manufacturing enterprises in Europe", was published in March 
1990. In this connection, the moves by Japanese businesses to set up Research and Development centres 
and "Design Centres" in Europe are of interest; these centres seek to pinpoint the actual requirements of 
the Community market. 
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However, careful Commission supervision will be needed to avoid distortion of com-
petition caused by Member States trying to outbid each other in offering incentives. 
In addition, the Commission should ensure overall "cohesion" between non-EC plants 
and Community-aided regional development schemes. 
3.9. On the agricultural front, the EC and Japanese stances have many points in 
common. Both are under pressure from the US (whose agricultural policy is strongly 
protectionist) and other food producer countries to open their borders and cut-farm 
subsidies. 
The EC and Japanese replies to such pressures have much in common. they can be 
summed up as follows: 
agreement to an all-round, but gradual, balanced and reciprocal reduction in sub-
sidies; 
agreement in principle to the framing of multilateral rules governing internation-
al agricultural trade; 
willingness to review existing agricultural policies, while protecting the basic prin-
ciples that underpin them. In both cases, these policies safeguard principles un-
related to the trade negotiations, such as preservation of the traditional rural values, 
regional and environmental protection and prevention of excessive dependence on 
food imports (particularly acute in Japan where the immediate post-war period 
is still a vivid memory). 
Both the EC and Japan are convinced that the way ahead lies in strengthening the mul-
tilateral instruments concluded within GATT; both disapprove of the proliferation 
of calls for bilateral partial agreements on trade in specific agricultural products. 
3.10 The Committee observes that EC and Japanese socio-economic problems in 
the long run have vital points in common. 
For instance, the MITI, in presenting its internal reform programme to be implemented 
in the 1990s,23 listed among its key concerns improvement of quality of life, consumer 
protection, the emerging needs of an ageing society and protection of women. 
These matters also receive considerable attention in the Community. The two parties 
could therefore profitably cooperate closely in organizing a continuous two-way flow 
of experiences and monitoring the effectiveness of the chosen solutions. 
23 Ministry of International Trade and Industry. "International Trade and Industrial Policy in the 1990s .... 
Creating Human Values in the Global Age". 5 July 1990. 
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The same holds good for the long-term development of the Japanese economy, flexi-
ble industrial structures, promotion of small and medium-sized businesses and ener-
gy and environmental policies. 
In the Committee's view, exchanges of views and experiences in these fields could be 
accompanied by joint research and projects. 
3.11. On the broader issue of economic relations and international policies, the Com-
mittee calls for a deepening and widening of EC-Japan relations to place them on a 
par with current EC-US and US-Japan relations. 
The world's three main centres of political and economic power should also embark 
on a strategy of cooperation and coordination aimed at achieving the "new interna-
tional order"- on which the security, harmony and prosperity of all peoples hinge. 
Done at Brussels, 25 Apri11991 
The Chairman 
of the 
Economic and Social Committee 
Fran~ois ST AEDELIN 
N.D.: Appendices overleaf. 
The Secretary-General 
of the 





JAPAN's MERCHANDISE TRADE BY AREAS 
(1977-1989) 
(US$m - Customs clearance basis) 
Total with USA with EC 
Exports Imports Trade Exports Imports Trade Exports Imports 
balance balance 
1977 80.495 70.809 9.686 19.717 12.396 7.321 8.736 4.195 
1980 129.807 140.528 (10.721) 31.367 24.408 6.959 16.650 7.842 
1983 146.927 126.393 20.534 42.829 24.647 18.182 18.523 8.120 
1986 209.151 126.408 82.743 80.456 29.054 51.402 30.675 13.989 
1989 275.175 210.847 64.561 93.188 48.246 44.942 47.908 28.146 
Source: Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs, Keizai Kobo Center, Japan 1990-
An international comparison, Tokyo 1990, page 36. 




EFTA 1 Total World 
USA 
Japan 




1984 1985 1986 
Outward Flows 
- 11,650 - 10,063 - 17,662 
-295 - 36 - 116 
-929 -760 9 
- 17,395 - 15,349 -22,164 
Inward Flows 
2,919 1,766 2,484 
390 646 445 
1,661 1,666 3,267 
6,177 5,637 6,840 










Source: XEUROST AT, Unit C3, Direct Investment of the European Community 1984 to 1988, 
Luxembourg 1990, pages 73 and 75 (EUROSTAT estimates) 
Notes: Outward Flows A positive figure indicates a net disinvestment 
A negative figure indicates a net investment 
Excluding reinvested profits 
Inward Flows A positive figure indicates a net investment 
A negative figure indicates a net disinvestment 



















DIRECT INVESTMENT: EUR 12 - USA -JAPAN 
(unit: million ECU) 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
made by: 
EUR 12 - 17, 395 - 15,349 - 22,164 -30,780 - 30,711 
USA 7, 128 1,233 - 8,796 - 8,605 - 1,997 
JAPAN1 - 7, 558 -8,455 - 14,713 - 16,916 - 28,931 
received by: 
EUR 12 6,177 5,637 6,840 12,578 14,278 
USA 28,460 26,733 36,969 39,357 43,870 
JAPAN1 -13 841 230 1,010 -410 
net 
investment: 
EUR 12 - II, 218 -9,712 - 15,324 - 18,202 - 16,433 
USA 35,588 27,966 28,173 30,752 41,873 
JAPAN1 -7,571 -7,614 - 14,483 - 15,906 -29,341 
1 These data are investments recorded in the Balanc~ of Payments by the Bank of Japan, and not investments 
"notified" to the Ministry of Finance. 
Source: EUROSTAT, Direct Investment of the European Community 1984 to 1988, 
Luxembourg 1990, page 11. 
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